Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Richard M. Hare and Anselm

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31 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]